Economic integration in Danish business history, 1850-2000

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Introduction

In the late 1980s Danish capitalism underwent a structural earthquake. The quake was caused by a remarkable change in the strategic nature and relative importance of the largest enterprises. A long-term database has illuminated how the annual GDP-Total Revenue relation (GDP/TR) of the 115 largest Danish corporations was relatively stable around 65 percent from 1975 to 1985. ¹ Then at the end of the 1980s the GDP/TR jumped from 67% in 1986 to 84% in 1990. Similarly the total number of employees (in Denmark and abroad) of the 25 largest companies was relatively stable from 155.329 in 1973 to 190.925 in 1983 but then it doubled to 386.337 in 1993 and continued to grow to 814.312 employees in 2003.² In the early 1970s the largest Danish companies were traditional exporters with domestic production and a relatively low status in the global corporate hierarchy. At the turn of 1990s they had become truly globalized and for the first time to be found among European market leaders within important economic sectors such as the diary, cleaning, brewing, shipping, slaughter house and windmill industries.³

A second dramatic turn on the economic Richter-scale occurred in the late 1980s concerning the GDP/FDI relation. In 1986 the total Danish FDI was only equivalent to 2.8 percent of the GDP

¹ See http://ilex.cbs.dk/corporatedk/CorporateDK/Welcome.asp.
compared to 7.8 percent for West Germany and 4.2 percent for Italy.\textsuperscript{4} Six years later, in 1992, the GDP/FDI relation had changed to 10.9 percent for Denmark, 8.6 for Germany and 5.6 for Italy and by 2002 the figures were respectively 49.8 for Denmark, 34.5 for Germany and 16 for Italy. Denmark had become a Small Open European Economy (SOEE), to use a terminology introduced by the American economic historian Joel Mokyr. According to Mokyr Danish capitalism was (like capitalism in the other SOEEs Austria, Finland, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) marked by a combination of efficient, stable democratic public institutions, a long-term insistence on liberal, open economic principles and finally the ability to define and exploit global niches.\textsuperscript{5} Mokyr points at an important relation between the liberal, open economy and the corporate capabilities to define and exploit global niches. Despite the importance of this relation this article questions to which extent the Danish transition of the late 1980s built upon a \textit{long-term insistence} on open, liberal principles. The trouble is that as mentioned above Danish economy and companies were relatively closed as recent as 1986.

This article thus concerns the long-term relation between economic integration and corporate strategies in Danish business history, 1850-2000. For decades business historians have analyzed strategic processes employed by multinational corporations. This article aims to contribute to this “business history in international business” tradition but from a different analytical perspective.\textsuperscript{6} Rather than focusing on changing corporate growth strategies the article is focused on the corporate relations to the regulatory processes which changed markets from restricted

\textsuperscript{4} UNCTAD, 2006


\textsuperscript{6} For an overview of business history and international business research see Jones, Geoffrey: Bringing history back to international business, Journal of International Business, 2006 (37), p.
protectionism towards competitive conditions. We will follow the changing market formation in Danish capitalism from the early, private, competitive stage via the private regulation of the early 20th century and the public restricted capitalism of the mid 20th century towards the last phase of increasingly public regulated, economic integration after 1980. On this background I will analyze how – and to which extent - the corporate structure and growth strategies changed congruently with the changing phases of economic integration. Throughout the period I will use Carlsberg as a micro-economic mirror showing how an important corporation responded – and contributed - to the Danish phases of more or less economic integration.

2. Economic integration in business history: An analytical framework

The long-term relation between economic integration and corporate strategy is a highly complex issue. In order to handle this complexity the following section consists of a framework which aims to bridge some important insights from three different approaches to economic integration: Integration economics, economic sociology and business history. I define “economic integration” in accordance to Jan Tinbergen’s classic work from 1954 as an economic course aiming to enhance competition through acts of negative and/or positive integration - that is respectively the removal of existing barriers to trade, and the introduction of new institutions for coordination and centralization.⁷ The importance of economic integration in modern capitalist development is hardly disputed, but contrasting theoretic approaches can be identified - particularly between integration economics and economic sociology.

Integration economics is based on a neo-classical faith in the market system. According to this line of thinking market-based free movement of production factors permits optimum allocation of labor and capital as rational consumers, entrepreneurs and investors will turn to more efficient markets, regions and companies. Enhanced competition caused by the free exchange of factors and goods thus promises a positive effect on the prosperity of all concerned. This logic was also present in Preamble of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, as the treaty was “... resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe.” One of the most important debates among integration economists concerns the importance of respectively negative and positive integration. In a recent general introduction the Dutch economist Willem Molle described “market integration” in the following way:

Market integration can proceed without much demand on institutions and policy making. The taking away of barriers can in general be easily and clearly defined, and once laid down in treaties is binding on governments, companies and private persons. There is little need for a permanent regulatory and decision-making machinery. In fact the approach of smooth negative integration contrasted to the empirical findings of research connected to the famous “Balassa-stages”. In a seminal book from 1961 Bela Balassa divided economic integration in five stages: Free Trade Area, Customs Union, Common Market,

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8 Neo-classical tradition refers to economists who at the end of the 19th century developed theories of economic growth based on rational actors and market principles.

9 Molle, p. 4.


11 Molle, Wilhelm: The Economics of European Integration, theory, practice, policy, Ashgate, 2006, p. 9-10. Molle continued to state that such smooth, negative integration (pure de-regulation combined with market corrections) “... is not the case in modern economies where the government frequently intervenes in the economy”. Economic sociologists argues that the governmental rules and regulations defines markets rather than intervenes in smooth self-sufficient market based economy.
Economic Union and Total Economic Integration. These stages have since been widely applied in trade theory, and scholars have recognized that Balassa’s original definitions underestimated the need for positive integration in relation to the initial stages: Free Trade Area and Customs Union. Historical-empirical analyses have thus emphasized how even the initial market integration stages required common supportive political-economic institutions – not only to correct markets rather than to define markets. To summarize the key concept in integration economy is “competition”, and based on the insights of the economists the horizontal parameter in analytical framework of this article reflects that increasing competition equals increasing economic integration (see figure one).

Economic-sociologists do not dispute that competition is essential in the analysis of economic integration. At the same time they do not accept the logic that market-based, open competition is in the interest of rational economic actors whom will make predictive choices causing general welfare. In contrast Neil Fligstein and others have described competition as a fundamental “problem” for the continuous survival and stability of firms: “... competitive markets confront producers as problems to be solved, and they do so using strategies of cooperation, combination, and product differentiation.” Private or public competition regulation is thus regarded as basic foundations in any capitalist market – foundations critical to the shape of corporate growth

13 Laffan, Brigid, O’Donnel’, Rory; Smith, Michael: Europe’s Experimental Union, rethinking integration. See discussion on the debate of positive integration concerning the Balassa stages p. 102-105.
strategies and organizational structures. In the case of free trade and open competition private actors will set up their own rules and regulations in order to escape from the destructive, instable competitiveness which always endangers large investments. At the same time they will pressure the states to introduce formal recognized institutional settings. Fligstein has defined “markets” as social systems characterized by structured exchange which need such rules and regulations in order to exist. In any capitalist economy at any time we can, according to this line of thinking, identify a specific, social “market architectures” including regulation which address property rights, governance structures and rules of exchange. Property rights defines who has claim on the profits of the firm including relations between different stakeholders, governance structures refer to rules that define relations of competition and cooperation, while rules of exchange defines whom can trade with whom under which conditions. To summarize the economic-sociological approach to economic integration recognize the importance of competition but the fundamental principle is regulation. Regulation is included in the framework of this article as the vertical factor. The contrast on this vertical line is not between the regulated versus the deregulated market rather than between a market architecture regulated by private vs. public actors. This distinction reflects a concrete ascertainment of which key-actors defined the market structure (property rights and governance structures): public governmental actors or private

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18 Neil Fligstein, The Architecture of markets, Princeton University Press, 2001 , p. 32-33. while rules of exchange define who can transact with whom and the conditions for trade. Fligstein also includes conceptions of control in his market architecture but they are excluded in this concrete analysis of economic integration as it is a meta category reflecting perceptions about how the market should function.
entrepreneurs and investors? The distinction does not reflect a motivational analysis as known from the regulation theory on "public interests" vs. "private interests".  

![Analytical framework of economic integration](image)

Figure 1: Analytical framework of economic integration

Figure 1 illustrates the horizontal level of competition and the vertical level of regulation. The process of economic integration can be regarded as any rightward movement that is from

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19 See for instance Stigler, George J., The Theory of Public Regulation, 1971 and Burgess, Giles H., Antitrust and Regulation, 1992. This theoretic distinction has proven difficult to translate into complex historical reality as regulatory processes often are mixtures of private and public interests - in many cases private actors would have an interest in more public regulation – for instance with small businesses interests in anti-trust laws. As the historian Per H. Hansen has emphasized in an article on Danish banking regulation, “...it is not always obvious where public interests stops and private interests begins”. Hansen, Per H.: “Bank Regulation in Denmark from 1880 to World War Two: Public Interests and Private Interests” in Business History, vol. 43, no. 1 (January 2001), pp. 43-68.
restricted towards competitive markets. The framework leads to four broad market-categories: In the low right the competitive, private regulated “bazaar” category, low left, the privately regulated and restricted “cartelization” category and above left the state regulated, restricted “plan-economy” category and finally above right the competitive, public regulated “common market” category. In his book “The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly” from 1966 Ellis Hawley discussed American competition policy of the mid-1930s. According to Hawley there were three ideological positions in the US during The Great Depression.\(^2^0\)

The first was a cartelized economy controlled by business. The second was a collectivist democracy where the state would aid in planning the economy to the benefit of all. The third was the competitive ideal, where the pursuit of individual self interests would result in the greatest good for the greatest number.

These three ideological positions reflect the categories of figure 1 – excluding the instable “bazaar” category. These are ideological-economic categories which have existed at least since the foundation of capitalism in the mid 19\(^{th}\) century. This ascertainment leads to the importance of business history in this analytical framework. In his book entitled “Multinationals and Global Capitalism” from 2005 Geoffrey Jones divided the global process of increasing economic integration in three broad periods.\(^2^1\) The first global economy from the 1880s was characterized as a time when “liberal policies took hold in many countries as governments withdrew from


\(^{21}\) Jones, Geoffrey: Multinationals and Global Capitalism, from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-first Century, Oxford University POress, 2005.
economic activities”.\textsuperscript{22} According to Jones the liberal era was challenged after 1914 when “numerous international cartel agreements were formed ... as firms sought to maintain prices in conditions of overcapacity”.\textsuperscript{23} The “disintegration” of the world economy in the interwar period was marked by national protectionism and barriers to trade. Despite the integration initiatives which followed the Marshall help and the West European regional integration then the broad disintegration of the world economy continued until around 1980. Jones rounds of the phases of integration by the period after 1980 when global trade intensified congruently with transnational market integration and the widespread policies of privatization. In relation to the analytical framework of this article Jones’ three phases – the first global economy (1880-1929), the disintegration (1930-1980) and the new global economy (1979-) reflects a C-shaped movement from the early competitive, private regulated capitalism of the 1880s via the cartelized capitalism of the 1910s and 1920s to the public regulated-protectionist capitalism of the mid 20\textsuperscript{th} century and finally the last era of globalization when “governments did not withdraw from the market for capital flows in the way they had before 1914” (see figure 2).\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. p. 20.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid. p. 28.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid. p. 29.
The most controversial aspect in the chronology of figure 2 is probably the increasing public regulation in the economic integration movement after 1980. Jones actually pointed at negative integration in his characteristics of the second globalization stating that deeper levels of economic integration were made possible by “a worldwide trend towards tariff reduction and privatization”.\textsuperscript{25} This framework on the other hand is based on a different assumption namely that the increasing economic integration after 1980 was based upon “re-regulation” rather than “de-regulation”. The increased global trade, investment flow and labor exchange after 1980 was in other words based upon a complex web of new agreements, standards, laws and regulations. In

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid. p. 35.
the book Globalization and Institutions from 2003 Marie-Laure Djelic and Sigrid Quack made an interesting distinction between the late 19th century globalization which they characterize by relatively ad hoc, isolated and case by case mechanisms – reflecting friendships, embedded trust and family links. In the period after 1980 the two authors in contrast have found evidence “of increasing formalization, structuration, codification, standardization and depersonalization of the rules of game ...”

The analytical model in figure 2 simplifies a complex development and it does not inform much about reasons for changes and dynamics of capitalism. On the other hand the fundamental presumption behind this article is that economic integration in its own right has been one of the most important sources for capitalism dynamics – both on the regional, national and trans-national levels. The model will function as a “road-map” in the analysis of Danish capitalism which follows the four chronological phases scheduled in figure 2 with emphasize on the relationship between corporate growth strategies and the changing market systems in terms of altered property rights, governance structures and rules of exchange.

3. Denmark, Carlsberg and the transition from bazaar economy to national cartelization

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Property rights in early Danish capitalism

The Trade Act of December 1857 is probably one of the most radical examples of negative economic integration in Danish business history. The Act, which was enforced in 1862, abolished the old guild system and the municipals charter system and confirmed the license to trade system. As unveiled below the changes lacked elements of positive integration. Only very few market rules and regulations followed and the 1857 act, which reflected the strong liberalistic movements of a time when the political-economic order changed from mercantilism to liberalism.

Table 1. Danish Company Acts, 1810-1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>The Act</th>
<th>The corporate governance conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1810</td>
<td>Regulation of May 15 1810</td>
<td>Royal charter or concession a necessary condition for incorporation. From the 1830s possible to formulate own by-laws and distinguish between anonymous (ltd. liability) and personal companies. From 1849 no entrusting of monopolies, only concessions by law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>Commercial Register Act (Firmaregisteret)</td>
<td>The public notification a necessary condition including: 1) Name, address and trade 2) Name of the persons authorized to sign on behalf of the company 3) One copy of the by-laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>Trade Register Act (Handelsregisteret)</td>
<td>Notification of anonymous ltd. liability companies to the Trade Reg. after the founding of the company Information about size of share capital but notification only required for companies within trade, crafts and manufacturing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>The Act of Danish Register of Companies (Aktieselskabsreg.loven)</td>
<td>All limited liability corporations required registered at least four months after the founding. Information about the size and sources of share capital. Control of the information in the registration by the public register.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>The Act of Danish Register of Companies of 1930</td>
<td>All limited liability companies registered Information controlled by the public register. Managers and a majority of the board should have residence in Denmark, be Danish citizenship or have at least two years residence (five years for the board members). General assembly to be held in Denmark. Detailed regulations concerning procedures in relation to changes of by-laws, share capital, board/management relation etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Dübeck, Inger: Aktieselskaberne Retshistorie, Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 1991; Friis Hansen, Søren: Hist, hvor vejen slår en bugt – om hjemstedsbegrebet i dansk og europeiske selskabsret, Juridiske Emner, SDU, 2005

Property rights are rules that define, who has claims on profits including relation between owners and management and the most important regulatory institution for this relation was the changing
company acts. From 1810 any legal Danish company needed a royal privilege or concession.\textsuperscript{27} This old procedures were in sharp contrast to the liberal movements and the § 92 of the democratic constitution in 1849 laid down the right to establish a society without preceding permission. This change from \textit{preceding} privileges to \textit{subsequent} registrations can be regarded as one of the most dramatic economic integration processes in relation to property rights. De facto the central administration followed a liberal policy already from around 1840 but formally the first corporate law came only in 1862 according to which corporations could be made legal (including limited personal liability) only by a subsequent registration of name, address, trade and a copy of the by-laws. It is worth noting that the initiative to this law was taken by a private wholesaler association in Copenhagen, “Grossersocietetets Komité”, which in April 1859 suggested a corporate register as the de facto neglecting of privileges meant that the making of new corporations was “completely uncontrolled”. From 1862 to the new corporate law of 1889 almost 500 Danish ltd. liability corporations were registered.\textsuperscript{28} This group included both older companies, that used the opportunity for ltd. liability and new companies resulting from large mergers. Most notably were the mergers initiated by C.F. Tietgen, the managing director of the universal bank, Privatbanken, which lead to some of the largest Danish companies including the shipyard B&W, which constructed the worlds first diesel driven ship, The great Northern Telegraph Company which connected Northern Europe and South East Asia and the shipping Company DFDS, which created a monopoly on the important domestic shipping routes, the Danish Sugar factories which limited completion and the telephone company KTAS, controlling all telephone operations in

\textsuperscript{27} Dübeck, Inger, p. 36-37.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid. P. 57.
Copenhagen. These new ltd. liability companies were of large importance to the modernization of Denmark and in the 1870s in was debated whether the liberal and imprecise Danish corporate law could handle the founding and expansion of these large enterprises. In an article from May 25, 1875 by the young lawyer Niels Lassen stated on the front page of the Daily newspaper Dagbladet that no other countries was a poorly prepared against fraud as Denmark. The main problem was, according to Lassen, that it was impossible for the public in general and the investors in particular to control the board of directors and the daily management who could manipulate both the share rates and the inner value. The debate continued among in the parliament but the liberal forces were strong - most important reason for the new corporate law in 1889 was a wish to coordinated the Nordic corporate laws. The extremely liberal conditions continued unaltered and in the 1890s and 1900s the public debate concerning fraud and lack of corporate control continued. The initial proposal for a real ltd. liability law (aktieselskabslov) was made by a government appointed committee in 1901, and one the most important changes was that the authorizes no longer only should register the corporations but also investigate to which extent the statements were correct. A banking crisis around 1908 enforced the public debate and the legal professor Carl Torp who stated that a new law was necessary as it not only would counterforce the most flagrant examples of fraud but also contribute to the a higher morale among the businessmen. Six proposals were made after 1910 and the heated debate continued. The chairman of the Federation of Danish Industries, Alexander Foss warned against a restrictive law which attempted to solve “moral issues” rather than economic circumstances – and Foss was in 1917 delighted to see that the final law would function “as a codification of the normal rules of a healthy development on a liberal

29 Lange, Ole, Stormogulen, Tietgen og hans tid, Gyldendal, 2008.
30 Dagbladet, May 25, 1875 citation from Dübeck, Inger.
In 1920 the largest bank Danish bank, Landmandsbanken, went bankrupt and corporate scandals and fraud was once on the public agenda. A public committee took initiatives for a more restrictive corporate law in the mid 1920s but it was only when the Federation of Danish Industries and the Chambers of commerce got involved that a new law was decided upon. The 1930 law combined more detailed accounting control of the ltd. liability corporations, including the requirement of annual reports, with national protectionism in terms of requirements of Danish citizenship in the management and board (see table 1).

The governance structure in early Danish capitalism

Early Danish corporate laws in the second half of the 19th century were exceptional liberal based solely registration rather than the usual international practice of public approval. This extremely liberal nature of early Danish capitalism was mirrored in the few public initiatives attempting to regulate competition.

Table 2. Public Danish competition regulation, 1857-1937

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1857-1920</td>
<td>Trade protection zones around borough towns</td>
<td>Restrictions in craftsman trades in a one mile zone around the old privileged royal borough towns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>Law on changes in trade protection</td>
<td>Liberalization of the above restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>Law against incorrect designation of goods</td>
<td>Prohibiting incorrect designations concerning goods’ origin, content, manufacturing methods and prizes or patents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Shops act on opening hours</td>
<td>Shops to be closed at 8 PM on weekdays and 11 PM on Saturdays (from 1904 holidays closed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Retail law against disloyal competition</td>
<td>Law prohibiting gift coupon systems in retail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914-1919</td>
<td>The August war laws</td>
<td>Price, production and import regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Law on protection of freedom of trade and organizations</td>
<td>Limited law protecting the individual right to establish a trade or join an organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>The IPU London resolution concerning the need for registration of trusts and cartels</td>
<td>The Danish political parties agreed to affiliate to a resolution of The Inter-Parliamentary Union which acknowledged trusts and cartels as natural economic phenomena, but recommended registration Law concerning the registration and control of price-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Law on price agreements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31 Dübeck, Inger, p. 129
agreements, a panel consisting of three judges could judge on apparently unfair consumer goods prices. Law against general price agreements which limited competition including registration and publication of price agreements and the establishment of a new price control board which could investigate private competition circumstances.


As table 2 illustrates the competition conditions were not regulated by the Danish state in the early decades of capitalism. Regarded in an international perspective it was rather unique that Denmark got its first real public control-based law against price regulation and cartels as late as 1937. It is well known that the American antitrust laws emerged already with the Sherman Act of 1890, Canada introduced the Combines Investigation Act in 1923, France its competition provisions in 1926, and in Norway a provisional Price act was introduced already in 1920 and a real Trust Act intended to control prices and cartels decided upon in 1926. Public Danish competition regulation came late, but the lateness cannot be explained by a lack of need as private competition regulation was full-fledged and emerged at an early stage. As mentioned above the first wave of Danish trusts and cartels emerged in the 1870s initiated by C.F. Tietgen managing director of the universal bank, Privatbanken. Tietgen was in the centre of a sophisticated business network focused on the utilization of new technologies, the limitation of competition and vertical integration. But Tietgens initiative also included mergers with the clear intention to private regulate and limit competition: In respectively 1866 and 1872 he mediated the largest Danish mergers of De Forenede danske Dampskibs rederier (DFDS, The united steamship company) and

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32 One limited exception was the 1 and 1½ mile trade protection zones around the old royal borough towns, which was a remaining aspect of the old priviliegie economy. These zones only concerning specific trades and were liberalized by a new law in 1873.


34 Lange, Ole, Stormogulen, Gyldendal, 2007.
De Danske Sukkerfabrikker (DDS, The Danish Sugar Factories), and in 1883 Tietgen facilitated the foundation of a paper price cartel, which in 1889 led to the formation of the trust like corporation De forenede Papirfabrikker. As the economic historian Willerslev noted in 1952, “... important parts of our industry [were given] a trust-like character before trusts and cartels played any important role in the economic structure of other countries.” And private Danish competition regulation accelerated in the 1890s.

Table 3 - Important Danish mergers around the 1890s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Company Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>United Paper Mills (De Forenede Papirfabrikker)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>United Breweries (De forenede Bryggerier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>The Copenhagen Timber Compagni (Trækompagniet i København)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>United Malt Factories (De Forenede Maltfabrikker)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>United Soap Factories (De forenede Sæbefabrikker)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>The Soda Factories (Sodafabrikkerne)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>United Constuctional Joineries (De forenede Bygningssnedkerier A/S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>United Coffee Roasters (De forenede Kaffebrænderier A/S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>The Danish Steam Mills (De danske Dampmøller A/S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897/1902</td>
<td>Danish Sulphur and Phophates Producers (Dansk Svovlsyre- og Superphosphat-fabrik)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>Silvan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>United Canneries (De forenede Conservesfabrikker A/S)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3 illustrates some of the most important Danish mergers in the 1890s, which led to companies entitled “The United ...” or “The Danish...”. As the competition conditions were publicly unregulated there is no official overview of the extent of cartelization. But in 1908 the author of the Industrial Review, Jak, Kr. Lindberg made a survey which remarkably concluded that following six industries were controlled by one single company or trust: The sugar industry, the bottle-glass industry, the paper industry, the cotton mills, the sulphuric acid works and the breweries. Other important markets were controlled by price and marketing agreements the markets of rye bread, distilleries, tileworks, cement works, match factories, chocolate, tobacco and margarine. \(^{35}\) In

short the most important Danish industries were severely cartelized by the early 20th century. This wide-spread use of private price-cartels was debated in the public and among politicians. In the late 19th century most debates concerned how to avoid the unhealthy consequences of “unfair competition”. In other words how public, or private interests, could limit competition.\textsuperscript{36} In the early 20th century the nature of the debate gradually changed as politicians, particularly from the socialist party and the social-liberal party, questioned the liberalistic economic order in general and the trust like private market regulation in particular. In 1912 the Danish Social Democrats for the first time suggested a possible public expropriation of the private Danish Sugar factories. As the historian Per Boje has pinpointed the timing coincided with the trust decisions against Standard Oil and American Tobacco Company in the USA and the Swedish appointment of a committee investigating trusts and cartels – a similar committee followed in Norway in 1913. The proposal did not receive much support from the conservative and liberal parties, and the debate changed its nature from 1914 to 1918 when the Danish war-economy was severely regulated by the state – in close co-operation with the industrial, and agricultural organizations. The war conditions caused a broad consensus behind this regulatory regime, but following the war, in 1919 and 1920, a hard, ideological debate concerning the future economic order of the country appeared. On the one side the social democrats suggested that the Danish state should take-over the ownership of several “monopoly-like corporations with in the manufacturing of sugar, oil, paper, matches, leather, fertilizer, cement, salt, spirits, beer and import of coal”.\textsuperscript{37} On the other

\textsuperscript{36} The most active lobbyists were the small retailers which felt they were under pressure from growing stores and new marketing methods such as coupon systems and various types of sales (fire sales, summer sales etc.). Competition within the retail sector became regulated by the Danish state with the closing hours regulation in 1908 and the irregular competition law in 1912- see table 2.

\textsuperscript{37} Boje, Per, 2004, p. 45.
hand the large industries and the conservative and liberal party resisted this development arguing for a “return” to the old, liberalistic order. As Arnold Fraenkel from the conservative party stated in the parliamentary debate in spring of 1918 he wanted an investigation that included the economic, technical and social advantages of the present concentrated corporations, as he was standing on the “capitalist foundation” resisting to live in the “slavery” of a socialist state. A Danish trust law was prepared by the parliament in 1920 but it never passed through the conservatively dominated second chamber (Landsting), and throughout the 1920s the debate continued and both the social-liberal party and the social democrats in vain re-suggested the public regulation scheme almost every year. It is remarkable that the first Danish law against private price regulation only appeared after the politicians had signed a “soft” Inter-Parliamentary conference convention in London in 1930 recognizing the need for registration of trusts and cartels. This convention was explicitly used as a reason for a Danish law which in 1931 introduced the registration of private price regulation. With the severe economic crisis of the 1930s the liberalistic economic order gradually lost its dominant position, and finally in 1937 a real controlling trust law was decided upon – 17 years after the formulation of the first proposal and after three decades of political and public debates.

*Rules of exchange in early Danish capitalism*

Both the property rights and governance structures were thus marked by a liberalistic order in early Danish capitalism and the third component in the market structure, rules of exchange, reflected this.

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**Table 4. Important Danish legislation concerning rules of exchange, 1863-1934**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Tariff Act of 1863</td>
<td>The abolishment of all export duty and reduction of import duty on</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
raw materials, still import tariffs on manufactured goods

The introduction of “krone” currency union and the
Simultaneous Scandinavian Monetary Union by fixing their currencies
to gold at par to each other. Dissolved in 1920 (in practice 1914)

Introducing the common European standard concerning weight and
length

Lowering tariffs on manufactured goods (10-20 %), protectionist tariff
on sugar

War time regulation of prices and production by commission with
representatives from the state, the industry and the labor

Protectionist act introducing a new currency agency restricted that all
import had to be approved by a commission with repr. From the
state, the industry and labour.

The first bi-lateral trade agreement with Great Britain and Germany

The rules of exchange define who can transact with whom and the conditions of these
transactions. Table four illustrates the most important Danish legal initiatives concerning rules of
exchange from 1863 to 1934. These initiatives can be divided in two broad phases; the initial
liberalistic acts, mainly aimed to facilitate the openness of the Danish economy and from the early
20th century are industrial policy by the state aimed to support the modernization of the country.

The tariff act of 1863 should be seen in conjunction with the contemporary liberalistic policies
concerning property rights and governance structures. The ideological background for abolishing
all export duty was a clear belief in free and open trade and the pragmatic background was that
Denmark as a small, agrarian economy was dependent on access to other markets. The
Scandinavian Monetary Union, which lasted from 1873 to 1920, provided fixed exchange rates and
stability in monetary terms. The Union came about after a series of Pan-Scandinavian economist
meetings in 1863 (Gothenburg), 1866 (Stockholm) and 1873 (Copenhagen), which focused on the

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Fligstein, 2001, p. 34.

As a result of the war with Preussia Denmark lost 2/5 of the former home market in 1864 and this dramatic change
on the one hand caused less competition from the more advanced industrial enterprises in the Duchies and the other
hand also meant that the home market was reduced and thus limited the growth opportunities of the emerging
industries.Hornby, Ove: “Industrialization in Denmark and the Loss of the Duchies, Scandinavian Economic History
Review, No. 1 19769, p. 23-57.
advantage of monetary standardization and rationalization.\textsuperscript{40} It is thus striking that the currency union resulted from an academic than a state initiative. But how did the private corporations exploit these international economic integration opportunities? The picture is mixed. The Danish cross-border commerce did in fact increase from around 15 percent of GDP in 1870 to more than 20 percent in 1895. But this export dynamics was based on the agricultural sector, with its successful cooperatively structured transition from the production of crops to the livestock-based production rather than industrial export.\textsuperscript{41}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5 - Distribution of GDP at factor cost by principal industrial categories (million DKK, current prices) and manufacturing industries export ratio (percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total GDP at factor cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man. Industries export ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Source:} Hansen (1970, p. 11)

Table 5 illustrates how the manufacturing industries’ share of the total export stagnated in the liberalistic years, marked by economic integration, from 1855 to 1890, and even fell from 1890 to 1900. It is remarkable that the industrial home-market orientation was so strong even in the 1890s, when the secondary sector grew much faster than the primary (see table 5) and the number of industrial workers grew substantially, from 42,526 in 1890 to 78,206 in 1900. The home-market based industrial growth of the 1890s leads to the second phase of in the rules of exchange initiatives. From the late 1890s the Danish state preceded an active economic policy,


\textsuperscript{41} For an in depth description of this transition see Mordhorst, Mads: Arla: from de-centralized co-operation to an MNE, in Fellmann et. al., “Creating Nordic capitalism, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 335-364.
which was a first step away from the liberalistic order of the 20th century including the introduction of the meter system in 1907 and the take-over by the state of the Technical Institute in 1908. Same year a continuously liberal trade act was decided upon, emphasizing Denmark’s position as the last country in Europe, together with Great Britain and the Netherlands that insisted of the free trade principles.42 The liberal forces were still strong, in particular those related to the export oriented agricultural sector. The industrial sector on the other hand was more engaged in the above described protection of a cartel-based governance structure (which was defended through anti-state liberalistic arguments) than in a defense of open, international trade.

To summarize an early competition-based, economic integration process took place in Denmark in the mid 19th century. This process was based on a strong liberalistic order which in short consisted of a new property rights regime based on a simple registration of ltd. liability companies combined with an extremely liberal competition governance structure and finally new rules of exchange which supported free trade through liberal tariff laws and a Scandinavian monetary union. At the end of 19th century this liberal “bazaar economy” became increasingly privately regulated. The merger wave of the 1890s took place congruently with a strong industrial growth – but it worth noting that this growth was domestically oriented rather than international. The open Danish trade was a agricultural based phenomenon until the 1950s. In relation to the industrial sphere, the early economic integration project was a rather domestic project, even though it did provide the opportunity for early export experiences. Experiences that proved important in the later

42 Jones, Geoffrey, ...
development of Danish capitalism, but on the other hand experiences, which were not fundamental to the over-all economy.

Carlsberg and the early market regulation

In 1857, when the liberal Danish trade act was decided upon, the founder of Carlsberg, J.C. Jacobsen, installed a 10 hp steam engine and a newly developed Belgian closed boiler in the ten years old brewery placed in Valby close to Copenhagen. Carlsberg was the first industrialized brewery in the capital and Jacobsen revolutionized the beer market in Copenhagen in November 1847 when he introduced the Bavarian beer characterized by a complex bottom fermentation under cold conditions which lead to a carbonated, vinous, bright beer. The public in Copenhagen praised the new beer and until the late 1870s the demand for Carlsberg beer was much higher than the presented output despite continuous extension of the production facilities. In the initial twenty-five years beer production at Carlsberg rose from 3548 hl in 1847-48 to 52,950 hl in 1872-73 and the number of employees rose from ten to fifty-one. In the 1880s an increasing number of new breweries entered the production of Bavarian beer and from 1872 to 1881 Carlsberg’s share of the Bavarian beer market decreased from 41 percent to 23 percent. According to the economic historian Kristoff Glamann the beer market in Copenhagen in the 1870s and 1880s was not marked by open competition on prices and quality.

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43 Iversen, Martin Jes and Arnold, Andrew, Carlsberg: Regulation of the home market and international expansion, in Fellman et. al.: Creating Nordic Capitalism, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 365-391

44 Fraenkel, Arnold, "Gamle Carlsberg, Copenhagen: Hegeneps Boghandle, 1897, p 132-197. In comparison Heinekens sale in 1880 amounted to hl. 64.000.

The competition in the 1880s was not an open competition on price, but an indirect competition in terms of over measure, discounts, cash loans – in reality free gifts to the middlemen, lending of equipment ... Following the foreign model the competition threatened to develop further into acquisitions of restaurants and shops.

The first official Carlsberg biographer, A. Fraenkel, described the Danish lager beer market in 1880s as a ‘Manchester-like’ and anarchistic market. It might have sounded promising for a liberal, but to Fraenkel it was of the utmost importance to avoid this destructive competition and establish an efficient cartel. In 1881, 1883 and 1890, attempts were made to establish self-regulation of the market, but in vain. However in the early 1890s, the incentives for self-regulation were particularly strong for Carlsberg, which faced intensified competition from new products. In 1881, Tuborg Breweries introduced pilsner beer to the Danish market. The new beer was, unlike other beers, bottled at the brewery and Tuborg established an alternative distribution network outside the traditional local distributors. The lighter pilsner completely changed the market. In 1893 traditional “Bavarian” lager still amounted for 95 percent of the beer production, but by 1912 its market share was reduced to 36 percent as pilsner became the most important beer type.

In 1891 the important business tycoon C.F. Tietgen succeeded in uniting 11 small lager and ‘hvidtøl’ (a Danish type of household beer) breweries in Copenhagen to the new company De forenede Bryggerier (DfB) and in September 1894 Tuborg joined the new Tietgen company. The Tuborg chairman Harald Fritsche left no doubt about the intention of the decision:

DfB will attain a completely different position from the one we have now, and this position will cause a more equal cooperation with the two large lager beer breweries [Old and New Carlsberg, MJI], which perhaps can contribute to homogenous rules for sale and credit.

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47 Glamann (1976), p. 50.
The result of Fritsch’s invitation to further corporation with Carlsberg was realised in February 1895 when De forenede Bryggerier and Carlsberg signed a 10-year market agreement. Carlsberg abstained from producing ‘hvidtøl’ and the three breweries’ future production was fixed on the basis of the production in the previous four years. Carlsberg’s manager, Aa van der Kühle, stated in 1904 – when the agreement ended – it would be impossible to get a cartel agreement unless the profit was shared. The next step after cartel was a real trust.  

The basic principle of the new Carlsberg-Tuborg agreement, signed in May 1903, was equality: The partners were equally represented in the common management, the profit was equally shared every year and important new investments in new domestic or foreign facilities had to be approved by the partner. The 1903 trust has been described as one of the most peculiar agreements in Danish business history. When it was signed it had an exceptional lifetime, 97 years until September 30, 2000, and even more remarkably, it operated with one idea: shared profit 1:1 ultimo each year simultaneously with two independent companies in terms of production and sale. This odd dualism proved to be problematic from the very beginning. The repeated disagreement were solved in an official arbitration, and the Danish states regarded the beer-trust legitimate as long as the common prices were laid down in cooperation with the public authorities.

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49 Nüchel Thomsen (1973), 61.

50 Due to its success with bottled pilsner beer, Tuborg had already by 1909 paid DKK 3.35 million directly to Carlsberg and so Tuborg demanded a new agreement for profit sharing. By the end of 1909 a compromise was agreed upon and in the following six years Carlsberg paid DKK 900,000 extra to Tuborg. But this compromise endangered the whole idea of profit sharing. In 1916 and 1921 attempts were made to merge the companies, but at the first attempt Vagn Jacobsen (grandson of J.C. Jacobsen) prevented the merger by raising a public debate about the future of the Carlsberg Foundation. In 1921, Tuborg’s dynamic manager Benny Dessau planned a new nationwide trust including all large Danish breweries, but this far-reaching plan was opposed by the chairman of the Carlsberg Foundation, Professor Kristian Erslev. The end-result was an accepted — but not passionate — partnership between Carlsberg and Tuborg from 1921 to 1970.
Steady progress in market shares and total production combined with stable profits probably also suppressed the recurring conflicts between Carlsberg and Tuborg. Still gradually, in the 1950s and 1960s, the 1903-agreement came under external pressure due to the growing exports and a general increasing public concern regarding private competition regulation. The agreement included no exceptions concerning export investments or income. Tuborg’s exports grew from around 25,000 hectolitres in 1945-46 to 250,000 hectolitres in 1956-57 while Carlsberg’s grew from 83,000 hectolitre in 1946-47 to around 341,000 hectolitre in 1956-57 and it then expanded further to 845,000 hectolitre in 1968/69 when Denmark was the largest beer exporter in Europe.⁵¹

In the 1960s some of the large international breweries went through structural changes, followed by investments in foreign facilities. Already in the early 1960s the Dutch competitor Heineken owned or had interests in 24 breweries abroad and in 1968 the Alfred Heineken decided to focus strategically on European expansion.⁵² Carlsbergs management aimed for a similar move including a key investment at the important British market. Tuborg opposed the idea, arguing that it would hamper Tuborg’s export to England and thus weaken the position of Danish breweries. According to the former chairman of De Forenede Bryggerier, Bernt Hjejle, Carlsberg lost around ten important years on the British market due to the limiting 1903 agreement.⁵³ By the end of 1960s the Danish Monopoly Authorities were increasingly unsatisfied by the price policy of Carlsberg and following a refusal on a suggested price raise the council of the Carlsberg/Tuborg trust held a meeting in May 1969 with three items on the agenda:⁵⁴

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⁵² Heineken International: The History of Heineken, see www.heinekeninternational.com/history_of_heineken_pdf


Chairman of the Carlsberg Foundation, Stig Iuul, opened the meeting with a long and important speech. The chairman declared an urgent need to merge Carlsberg and Tuborg. The agreement was a constraint on the corporate growth after Denmark's possible membership of the European Community and the following economic integration process. Secondly Iuul pointed at the enhanced public suspicion against the unequal production costs but similar consumer prices at Carlsberg and Tuborg. After several months of secret negotiations the merger was signed on May 25, 1970. Consequently Carlsberg was no longer restricted in its international expansion and already in November 1974 the brewery opened its so far most advanced brewery in Northhampton, England. Sales abroad rose from 1.6 million hl in 1970 to 16.1 million hl in 1990, while sales in Denmark only grew from 4.1 million hl in 1969 to 5.3 million hl in 1990. Carlsberg’s strategic responses to the economic integration process is the topic of the next section following an analysis of Denmark's transition from a protected planned economy in the 1940s and 1950s to becoming part of an integrated common market in the late 1980s.

**Denmark, Carlsberg and the transition from plan economy to common market**

From around 1930 to the turn of the 21st century changes of the three aspects of market formation (property rights, governance control and rules of exchange) reflected a abroad movement from national based, state regulation towards a European influenced more liberalistic regulatory regime.
### Property rights in Danish capitalism, 1930-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Year</th>
<th>The Act</th>
<th>The Corporate Governance conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>The Act of Danish Register of Companies of 1930</td>
<td>All limited liability companies registered. Information controlled by the public register. Managers and a majority of the board should have residence in Denmark, be Danish citizenship or have at least two years residence (five years for the board members). General assembly to be held in Denmark. Company accounts have to be given to authorities, but family enterprises can avoid publication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>The Public Limited Companies Act The Private Limited Companies act</td>
<td>All limited liability companies have make publication of annual reports and accounts. For the first time a definition of “Groups” (Koncern). Employees represented in the Board of Directors. Accounting standards follows the existing practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Financial Statements Act I</td>
<td>Implementation of the fourth European directive concerning accounting practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Financial Statements Act II</td>
<td>Implementation of the seventh European directive concerning Accounting practices with particular emphasis on disclosure rules and measurements relating to groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>The 1993 reform</td>
<td>Only one person can register a ltd. lia. Company. With 90 percent of Shares it became possible to inforce a take-over, easier to change Cooperatives into ltd. lia. And the chairman of the board restricted from positions in the daily management.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Christiansen, Merete, “Accounting regulation in Denmark, European Accounting Review 1993, 3, 603-616.

Table six mirrors that Danish regulation concerning ownership and profit distribution was very stable in a long period from the 1930s to the early 1970s. The Act of 1930 could not be regarded as very liberal in its nature as it was based on state control of the registered companies, and all listed companies had to submit annual accounts to the authorities, even though family enterprises could avoid publication. By allowing accounting secrecy, preference shares and lack of directors’ annual reports the Act encouraged and preserved strong internal powerbases. This lead to three important types of Danish ownership regimes in the period: The closed version of family capitalism\(^{55}\), the foundations\(^{56}\) and in companies with dispersed ownership but very weak

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\(^{55}\) Expanded export oriented industrial firms such as Danfoss, Grundfos and Lego represented a closed version of family enterprises marked by limited public insight in the corporate matters and powerful family owner-managers.

\(^{56}\) The second ownership version was foundations often established in relation to generational change or due to tax matters. Often the foundations, such as Carlsberg foundation, the Novo foundation (controlling the medical exporter Novo Nordisk) and Almenfonden (controlling A.P. Møller-Mærsk) controlled the important A-shares with voting rights
external stakeholders.57 A recent analysis of the post-war development of the dispersed Great Northern Telegraph Company (GN) illustrated how explicit financial interests of external shareholders were consistently disregarded by the board of directors from the 1930s to the 1960s, concluding that in the period: “... an extremely stable internal power base ... made GN’s low dividend/high investment policy possible.”58

The new corporate act of 1973 was an attempt to convergence the Nordic corporate Acts and it included new rights to the external stakeholders including compulsory annual reports, a new definition of “groups” including group accounts as a request and employees membership in the boards of directors. In 1981 the international convergence pattern intensified with the implementation of the EC fourth directive and in 1990 the seventh directive concerning disclosure rules and group account methods.59 A new reform in 1993 included the sixth corporate act directive including the right to establish a company with one founder and altered structures in the corporate governance regimes.60 Despite the gradual strengthening of external stakeholders position and the convergence toward European corporate Act standards after 1973 then the three established Danish ownership regimes encouraged and preserved by the long lasting 1930 Act while B-shares without voting rights were distributed to the public. It should be noticed the entrepreneurial families often controlled the foundations.

57 Two of the old large Danish companies, ØK founded by H.-N. Andersen in 1884 and The Great Nothen Telegraph Co., founded by Tietgen in 1869, were prime example of this “managerial capitalism”: In the period from 1930 to 1980 profits were mainly re-invested and a


59 Christiansen, Merete, "Accounting regulation in Denmark, European Accounting Review 1993, 3, 603-616.

60 The act prohibited that the chairman of the board of a listed company could at the same time function as CEO – this change was direct respond to the “Nordisk Fjer” corporate scandal in which a powerful chairman / CEO had ruined an old company without sufficient board of directors control. In this way the act further weakened the internal power bases.

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continued to dominate among the largest Danish enterprises – together with the co-operative ownership model in the agricultural sphere.\textsuperscript{61} Neil Fligstein has pointed at the weak implementation of property rights integration in Europe after 1992 and this national characteristic is confirmed by the persistently, peculiar ownership structures in Denmark.\textsuperscript{62}

From stable competition regulation to European law

The public regulation of competition from 1930 to 2000 was marked by a long period of stability from 1955 to the mid 1980s when increased demands for changes, including more international coherence, emerged among Danish politicians, economists and businessmen.\textsuperscript{63}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|l|}
\hline
Year & Name & Content \\
\hline
1937 & 2\textsuperscript{nd} Law on price agreements & Law against general price agreements which limited competition including registration and publication of price agreements and the establishment of a new price control board which could investigate private competition circumstances \\
\hline
1940 & Law on Prices etc. & War regulation of prices and production regulating competition by the control of profits, imports etc. continued until law of 1952 with some amendments in the late 1940s. \\
\hline
1949 & Appointment of “Trust Commission” & Commission appointed to investigate international Competition policy and the Danish situation \\
\hline
1952 & Law on prices & Opportunity to set prices in accordance to a more but continued state regulation of prices - from 1956 to the mid 1980s: 16 new laws on price-regulation. \\
\hline
1955 & The Monopoly Law & New law including the establishment of a Monopoly Council, private competition regulation accepted but continued need of public registration. Rising prices could only happen with the approval of the council. \\
\hline
1984 & Committee: modernization of the 1955 law & Commission suggesting a competition law rather than Monopoly law – based only on the need for higher Economic efficiency – continued public control principle \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Public Danish competition regulation, 1937-2000}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{61} The ten largest Danish corporations in 2007 included:

\textsuperscript{62} Fligstein, Neil, Euroclash, the EU, European identity, and the future of Europe, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 72-73.

\textsuperscript{63} For a further discussion on these demands of changes see Per Boje (2003) p. 220-239.
1989  Law on competition  New law based on the committees suggestions
1993  OECD report on Danish competition  Very critical report on the competition conditions
1997  Law on competition  New strengthened law based on prohibition principle
2002  Law on competition  Further strengthened law including merger control
And the competition council aloud to use the EU Legislation.

Sources: Boje, Per: Marked, erhvervsliv og stat, Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2004

With the price regulation law of 1937 a public Danish institution “the Price Control Council” had been established. This council proved to be very important during the Second World War and the following two decades, as the administration of prices and profits was a key tool in the detailed public price-regulation of the Danish economy from the 1930s to the 1970s.\textsuperscript{64} The detailed price regulation affected competition conditions in Denmark and was thus included in the 1937 law, but after the Second World War a political pressure for a real trust- or cartel law emerged. The Trust Commission was appointed in March 1949 after a parliamentary debate.\textsuperscript{65} The commission was managed by Copenhagen Business School professor H. Winding Pedersen and in 1953 it passed over a recommendation for a Danish trust law which should ensure four things: economic effectiveness, distribution of wealth (avoiding monopoly concentration of capital), freedom of trades and protection of small co-operations. The proposal went further than the 1937 law as it included some of the public price regulation which since had been institutionalized – according to §24 the authorities for instance should approve any rise in prices suggested by registered cartel members. On the other hand the proposal was still based on the publicity- and control principle meaning that trusts and cartels were legal if notified to the authorities. A law proposal was

\textsuperscript{64} The average annual number of employees in the Danish Price control Council expanded from 4 in 1937, 18 in 1939, 30 in 1940, 100 in 1942, 300 in 1945, 350 from 1946-1948, 150 from 1950-1952 and then down to less than 100 from 1953 to the late 1960s, Per Boje (2003) p. 136 and 156.

\textsuperscript{65} The trust issue was surprisingly raised by the conservatives as they feared the future challenges to small Danish businesses caused by international cartels – in particular the margarine-cartiel lead by the British-Dutch giant Unilever
presented in the Danish parliament in December 1953 and it is striking that the Social Democratic MP, Lis Groes, described the contemporary private competition regulation as “if the old guild-system had been resurrected in a modern shape”.66 The law was adopted in 1955 and after intense lobby activities by the industrial organizations from 1955 the purpose was changed from the suggestion by the council as “a law which should be used when competition was limited due to companies’ size, financial connections, arrangements, passages and other organizational matters”, towards the softer “a law which should be used if competition was limited in such a way that it does, or will, influence substantially the price-, production- or transport- matters”.67 Same formulation as in the 1937 law.

The trust law of 1955 lasted until the mid 1980s and strikingly the Monopoly Council, which took decision on possible competition violation, was managed by the same director, W.E. von Eyben, from 1955 to 1980. How do we explain this long term stability. An important factor is emerging symmetry of interests between the workers movements, the private enterprises and the state. The case of the Danish brewery industry, which had price-regulating cartel from 1899 to 1988, showed that the active brewery hand union accepted strong organized employers as a cartel helped to ensure stability for the employees.68 The brewery industry itself, dominated by Carlsberg/Tuborg favored stability in the market structure and finally the state supported the highly organized market as it ensured stable, predictable tax income. In contrast to the heated ideological debate after the first world war the late post 1945 decades were marked by a

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67 Ibid. p. 203.

consensus behind organized capitalism, with restricted market in which a strong state accepted private competition regulation – as long as it was registered, controlled and followed by a bureaucracy.

In the 1980s the ideological debate concerning the role of the market reappeared and in December 1984 a committee, consisting of law professor Bent Christensen and to economists Poul Nyboe Andersen and Anders Ølgaard, was appointed to suggest a revised law.69 The committee proposal of 1986 entitled “From monopoly law to competition law” was representative for the liberalistic movements of the period as it suggested to focus the law solely on the matter of ensuring economic efficiency. The following Law of 1990 included for the first time public organizations and it continuously built upon the publication and control principle. The new competition council should ensure competition by a high degree of openness from the enterprises but the law only included one real “prohibition” against fixing gross prices.70

As emphasized in the introduction to this article the Danish business structure had gone through a dramatic transition by the late 1980s. Big business had become bigger, more concentrated and thus economically more powerful. The structural change resulted from a wave of mergers in the late 1980s and most often the motive behind these mergers was to prepare the Danish enterprises to the up-coming international competition of the European Common Market – decided upon in 1987 with effect from January 1, 1993. Within the banking sector six of the largest Danish banks formed to new groups in 1990 and perhaps even more dramatic the slaughterhouse and diary industry gradually changed from a decentralized structure in the early 1970s – with more than 50

69 Boje, Per, Marked, erhvervsliv og stat, Aarhus Universitetspres, 2003, p. 203.
70 Ibid., p. 209.
independent slaughterhouses and dairies in the early 1980s – to situation at the turn of the century with only large slaughter house company, the European market leader “Danish Crown” and one large diary “Arla Foods” market leader in Scandinavia and Great Britain.\footnote{Iversen, Martin Jes, " Corporate responses to Institutional Change" in Schröter, Harm G. (ed.): The European Enterprise", Historical investigation into a Future Species, Springer Press 2008.}

In January 1993 OECD published a very critical report concerning the Danish competition situation and regulation.\footnote{Kallestrup, Morten, Marked, Erhversliv og stat, Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2003, p. 259.} The Danish business structure was, according to OECD, marked by substantial private competition regulation due to cartels and dominant firms. OECD recommended that Danish law changed from the control principle towards the prohibition principle stating that any limitation of competition is illegal if it is not mentioned as acceptable in the law. After several years of preparation a new law was agreed upon in May 1997, and this time it followed the prohibition principles of European competition law and in general the law was prepared in close co-operation with the European authorities – for the first time the law stated that in their very nature private competition regulation and abuse of a dominant position \textit{per se} was illegal in Denmark.\footnote{Ibid., p. 265}

\textit{Rules of exchange from a Danish to a European context}

The rules of exchange followed the pattern of property rights and competition regulation in its broad transition from a national institutional base towards a highly European influenced system
from the late 1980s onwards. The most striking characteristic of the new trans-national rules of exchange was the complexity and detailed regulation creating new markets on a functional basis..

Table 7. Important Danish legislation concerning rules of exchange, 1934-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933-1934</td>
<td>Bilateral Trade Agree.</td>
<td>The first bi-lateral trade agreement with Great Britain and Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Law on Prices etc.</td>
<td>War regulation of production regulating rules of exchange by the control of imports, production etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>OEEC trade liberalization</td>
<td>50 % elimination of quantitative import restriction required in the OEEC area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>Currency restrictions</td>
<td>Continued restrictions on cross border currency transactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>New import customs</td>
<td>Change in policy from import regulation to customs: Result highest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>EFTA established</td>
<td>Membership of Free trade area: gradual abolishment of import customs and immediate abolishment of quantitative import regulat. (GB, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria and Portugal)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1973       | Membership of EEC         | Part of the West European customs union including a common agricul-
|            |                           | tural policy but excluding economic integration of other areas than Goods market         |
| 1972-1979  | The currency “snake”      | Danish membership in the “currency snake” cooperation                                     |
|            |                           | Established after the break down the Bretton Woods system in 1971:                         |
|            |                           | The “snake” currencies could only disperse to a certain limit                            |
| 1979       | EMS                       | Danish membership of the European Monetary System (EMS)                                   |
| 1982-1987  | Fixed currency policy     | Fixed currency policy towards the ECU                                                   |
| 1987       | Single European Act       | A concrete plan for the creation of a common market including general principles for a common market including non-fiscal barriers and following white papers for the rules of exchange of specific sectors |
| 1993       | Single European Market    | European market based on the free movement of goods, capital and remaining national quotas vis-à-vis third countries eliminated |
| 2002       | Euro introduced           | Danish krone fixed to the euro                                                          |

One of the main aspects of the protectionism in the 1930s was the substantial quantitative import restriction and the regulation of cross-border currency transactions. OEEC, founded as a coordinating body of the Marshall help in 1948, required already in 1949 that the receiving countries should eliminate 50 percent of their quantitative import restrictions. The long-term aim was to replace the pre-war bilateral trade system with multilateralism in the Western hemisphere.

The gradual liberalization of the European markets was never-the-less a complex development marked by several attempts to continue the protection of domestic industry through non-fiscal barriers such as different standards and national strategies which kept import regulation within
industries regarded as important for the home market. In the Danish context the membership of EFTA in 1960, caused a change from import regulation towards external customs and this had in particular an impact on the expanding industrial sector while the agricultural sector was left out of the cooperation and the networking industries, the financial sector and the service sector at this stage was continuously marked by various trade barriers.

The Danish membership of the EEC in 1973 was followed by ten years of stagnation in the integration process in which member states initiated unco-ordinated national crisis policies through devaluations and even state funded 'buy-national' campaigns. The so-called 'Euro sclerosis' lasted until January 1985 when Jacques Delors was appointed as the new chairman of the European Commission. In January 1986, the European leaders agreed upon the Single European Act (SEA) which consisted of new institutional changes, such as a stronger role for the Parliament and more majority voting at the expense of the former unanimity rules, and new concrete political economic initiatives - most important the preparation of the internal market in 1992, which included 'abolishing of barriers of all kinds, approximation of legislation and tax structures, strengthening of monetary cooperation and the necessary flanking measures to encourage European firms to work together'.\footnote{Single European Act, 1987, EEC 1987.} Following the membership of the European Community in 1973, Danish trade with the European countries rose from DKK 24.4 billion in 1973 to DKK 42.1 billion in 1978, or from 65 per cent of total exports to 69.5 per cent of the total exports. But remarkably, the share of Danish export to the other West European countries
stagnated and even fell in the early 1980s from 63.5 per cent in 1982 to 58.7 per cent at the lowest point in 1984.75

This stagnation – which indicates that Danish membership was not followed by any immediate ‘Europeanization’ of the economy – went on to the mid-1980s. The picture changed in the latter part of the 1980s in line with the rising dynamics of the European integration process. From 1985 to 1991, the share of exports to the other community members rose from 58.7 per cent in 1984 to 68 per cent in 1991. Export to other West European countries was stable around 65 per cent throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. The high share of EU exports within total Danish exports indicates that the European market gradually became more important for the Danish companies, particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the institutional framework in terms of the SEA and the Common Market was implemented.76

Table 8 - Foreign Direct Investments by Denmark outward; the EEC, in total, EEC% of total, 1982-1992 (mill. DKK, annual prices)

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<tr>
<td>Denmark FDI out</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>2.395</td>
<td>11.402</td>
<td>18.300</td>
<td>24.420</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI outward EEC</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>4.227</td>
<td>13.502</td>
<td>27.800</td>
<td>37.378</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI outward total</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC of total FDI</td>
<td>20.81%</td>
<td>56.66%</td>
<td>84.45%</td>
<td>65.83%</td>
<td>65.33%</td>
</tr>
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Source: Danish Statistical Department, For the years 1982 - 1990 EEC included the following countries: Belgium-Luxembourg, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain & United Kingdom

Danish companies went through a substantial transition in a short time. From a relatively low level of outward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the early 1980s towards a very high level of outward FDI in the 1990s and early 2000s. It rose from DKK 596 million or only 0.3 per cent of the GDP in 1982, while in 2000 and 2001 the outwards FDI was 10.3 and 3.6 per cent, respectively, of the


76 Ibid.
GDP. In other words Danish companies – and indeed the Danish economy – became more open and international from the mid-1980s and onwards.77

Carlsberg and the transition to a common market

While the terms of the 1903 agreement gave a framework for co-operation within Denmark, there was no agreement about co-operation in international markets. The two competed with each other already in Belgium and the UK and to avoid a worsening of the competition, the two agreed that investment in new breweries could take place as long as it was outside their main markets. This gave rise to brewery projects in Turkey and Iran for Tuborg in 1967, and Cyprus (1967), Malawi (1968), Brazil (1970) and Malaysia (1972) for Carlsberg. According to the former chairman of the Carlsberg Foundation, Kristof Glamann, ‘The two breweries almost blocked each on the international market. The German breweries had started to merge and we feared that the Dutch would acquire in Denmark. With the merger with Tuborg we gathered our strength and started our expansion seriously’78.

In the years after the merger between the two trust partners Carlsberg and Tuborg in 1970, it was no longer just exports that counted towards sales in foreign markets. Licensing deals became more important as a source of both income and volume. In 1970, exports made up only around 24% of total sales and sales from licence agreements were negligible. However, during the 1970s and 1980s sales outside Denmark, both from exports, licence deals and investments, rose rapidly as a percentage of total sales. Sales of Carlsberg and Tuborg produced outside Denmark surpassed

77 Ibid.

78 Interview with Kristof Glamann, Børsen, June 23, 1993
sales in the home market for the first time in 1976\textsuperscript{79} and continued to grow. From 24% in 1970, it climbed to 60% in 1980/81 and 90% in 1999/2000. At that time Carlsberg and Tuborg products were available in more than 140 countries.

The move towards licence agreements was driven by the need to cut costs after the oil shock of 1973. As fuel costs increased, so too did the cost of exporting beer. It was cheaper to export know-how in the form of licensing agreements, while a licensing agreement together with a minority stake allowed greater access to the partner’s distribution network. Increasing unrest among Danish labour unions also meant that supply from Denmark had become unreliable.

Table 10.1 Countries with Carlsberg licensing partners

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<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>Nepal</td>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
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<td>Greenland</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>Russia</td>
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\textit{Source:} Carlsberg

Although the merger solved immediate problems, there were still differences that needed to be resolved between the two former competitors. Throughout his time at the company CEO Poul Svanholm kept two offices – one at Carlsberg in Valby and one at Tuborg in Hellerup – to ensure that both organisations felt themselves equally treated. His rationale for keeping the two organisations separate was to maintain ‘power and vitality’, although it was also necessary to ensure visible proof to the authorities of the competition that existed in the Danish market. However, it also helped prevent the development of a single head office capable of rational and

\textsuperscript{79} Carlsberg Annual Report 1977
strategic decisions at home and abroad. Marketing was a particular challenge. Carlsberg and Tuborg were often available on the same markets, competing for the same customers and often with different licence brewers for the two brands.

Graph 1: Carlsbergs ownership shares of subsidiaries, 1967-1985

*Source: Carlsberg, various reports*

The lack of clarity in marketing internationally was also a result of an organisational structure that was far more suited for an export and licensing company than it was for a global brewer. After the merger Carlsberg and Tuborg had separate sales organisations for Carlsberg and Tuborg in Denmark, as well as separate organisations for overseas business. Carlsberg International looked after export sales and licensing agreements for Carlsberg, while Tuborg International did the same job for Tuborg. A third organisation, United Breweries International, looked after foreign breweries in which United Breweries had a shareholding.

Expansion abroad throughout the 1970s and 80s was still driven by the idea that Carlsberg and Tuborg were high quality, high priced products that didn’t take market share from established,
domestic breweries. This policy was described by Carlsberg’s managing director Poul Svanholm in an interview in 1983: ²⁰

‘We would like to enter those markets where we see an opportunity for a growth in beer sales so we can get a share of that growth. We are not so interested in gaining sales by taking market share from other breweries. That’s not our way. We have, by the way, a policy of going to the local brewers and telling them that we intend to establish ourselves in the country.’

The choice of partners and investment type was governed by a mixture of traditional attachments, chance and some conscious strategic choices. Investment in the breweries in Hong Kong and Malaysia was undertaken with its old export partner East Asiatic Company, while others were a development of existing strong export markets such as the UK. However, many of the partnerships in this period were a result of interested breweries contacting Carlsberg enquiring about the possibilities of licensing the beer ²¹. This policy of taking a small stake was dubbed a ‘business card’ strategy as it allowed Carlsberg to quickly gain a foothold in a market with limited investment. However, it also meant that Carlsberg rarely had a majority in the companies concerned, and therefore little management control.

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²⁰ Interview with Poul Svanholm, Måneds Børsen, August 1983

²¹ Ibid.
Graph 2: Carlsberg's ownership shares of subsidiaries, 1986-2001

Source: Carlsberg, various reports

In the period up until 1997 it was rare for Carlsberg to take a majority stake in a brewery. When it did invest in a brewery, it generally did so as part of a licensing agreement and the total share rarely rose above 30% and was more typically under 20%. In 1996, the company held a majority in only eight of the 27 foreign breweries it had a stake in. Carlsberg’s technical organisation was one of the few common elements. Licensing agreements included access to Carlsberg’s laboratory research and quality control, which gave its partners an advantage on their home markets as the technology was transferred to local beers. But it also underlined the company’s focus on the ability to produce a ‘quality’ product rather than sell it.

The year 1997 marked several important events in Carlsberg’s history as a company. It was the year it celebrated 150 years as a brewer, it was the year that Poul Svanholm retired and it was the year that marked the end of the business card strategy. In the time since the merger, the policy of expanding through licensing and minority partnerships had resulted in a patchwork of holdings.

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82 Figures from Carlsberg annual reports various years.
across the world, but with little strength outside the top five markets for both the Carlsberg and Tuborg brands. The situation was worsened by the fact that in many of these markets Carlsberg was a minority shareholder. Where it did have the majority, profitability was poor. Added to this was an international organisation that was little more than an export sales function with little or no control over partners or their production. Despite the fact that international sales had outstripped domestic sales since 1976, the international organisation was still subordinate to a Danish-dominated administration that spent a proportionately large amount of time on managing domestic issues. Carlsberg’s weakness was underlined in 1997 when the Dutch brewer Heineken bought Cruzcampo in Spain from under its nose, despite Carlsberg’s existing 11% share in the brewery acquired in connection with a licensing agreement. In effect, Carlsberg was thrown out of Spain – one of its top 10 profitable breweries – and the business card strategy was shown to be ineffective in the face of growing worldwide consolidation in the brewing industry.

Graph 3: Carlsberg’s ownership shares of subsidiaries, 2001-2006
Source: Carlsberg, various reports
The Carlsberg Foundation opened the way for international expansion in 1999 by relinquishing the requirement that it hold a minimum of 51 per cent of the Carlsberg brewery in return for holding a ‘significant interest’ in subsidiaries owned by Carlsberg A/S. The requirement to hold a minimum of 51% had been criticised by stock market analysts as it limited Carlsberg’s ability to attract capital for expansion. This was underlined in March 2000 when Carlsberg missed out on acquiring the Kronenbourg brewery because its owners, the French conglomerate Danone, wanted part payment in shares. Carlsberg’s ownership structure made this sort of deal impossible.

The deciding step in the brewery’s future came in May 2000, when Carlsberg and Orkla announced the creation of a new brewing group – Carlsberg Breweries – made possible by the Foundation’s decision. In one move, Carlsberg secured its Nordic market by acquiring the leaders in Norway and Sweden, and gained access to the booming central and eastern European markets through a 50% share in Baltic Beverage Holding, BBH. Orkla’s impact on Carlsberg was to be more than a simple securing of Carlsberg’s Nordic backyard. The Norwegian conglomerate accelerated the process of internationalism by providing the management capacity that Carlsberg lacked in depth and bringing tools that would help Carlsberg manage its existing breweries and make it easier to take on more. In the first two years, the new organisation began the job of integrating IT, accounting, marketing, production and logistics, starting with the Nordic region. Brewery acquisition continued, driven by the merger. and in the years 2000-2002 Carlsberg Breweries increased its share or bought outright 11 breweries and entered a major joint venture in Asia.

**Conclusion**

The relationship between economic integration and Danish business history from 1850 to 2000 has in this article been divided in four phases: the early bazaar economy from around 1850 to
1880 the cartelization from around 1880 to 1930, the planned economy from around 1930 to 1980 and finally the common market from around 1980 to 2000.

Early Danish capitalism was marked by extremely liberal market condition in terms of property rights, competition regulation and rules of exchange. Already in the 1870s the respond to this situation was an early cartelization which accelerated with the mergers in the 1890s. In the Danish case the private entrepreneurs regulated capitalism and the perhaps most striking characteristic of this period was the absence of the state. The Danish corporate responses to competition were restructuring and close corporate cooperation. This strategy can be illustrated by Carlsbergs 1903 agreement with its main competitor Tuborg. An agreement which effectively controlled not only competition but also production, development and internationalization. Denmark at the same
time was an open economy and the industrial corporations get the first international experiences through export primarily to the other Nordic countries and Great Britain.

In the early 20th century the state gradually entered the stage of Danish capitalism. The ideological battle about market regulation after world war 1 illustrated the contrast between the old liberalistic interests of the industrial leaders and conservative politicians and on the other hand the empowered social democratic leaders and the union leaders which during world war one had participated in detailed market regulation. The crisis of the 1930s marked the Danish entrance to the third phase of the model namely the planned economy. The perhaps most important characteristic of this period was the long-term stability of the market structure. Both the property right institutions and the competition regulation hardly changed its foundation from around 1945 to around 1985. This stability was reflected by a dominant corporate growth strategy based on close cooperation between competitors, the state and the unions. The cooperative capitalism was combined with increased international activities in terms of export to the Western allies within OEEC, EFTA and later EEC and EU. In the 1970 and 1980s a second common characteristic between the three components of the market structure emerged: a transition from national law setting to a European approach. Gradually the corporate laws transformed into a European nature. The Competition law finally in 1997 became “Europeanized” and the rules of exchange were at this stage marked by industry-specific non-Danish standards and systems defined for functional markets such as banking, telecom, services sector. etc. Danish companies such as Carlsberg responded to this market change through mergers and acquisitions. Carlsberg change from an exporter with minority interests around the world towards becoming a real global group with several home markets and a global strategy of marketing, management, production development,
H&R etc. As in the 1890s the mergers created corporations that dominated Danish activities within key sectors.  

But there were two important differences between the concentration of the 1890s and 1980s. Firstly the merged firms if the 1980s were focused on niches of trans-national markets’ rather than dominance of a national market sphere, and secondly the large companies was now part of a different market structure characterized by public regulation with detailed legislation concerning property rights, competition and rules of exchange.

Joel Mokyr suggested that the Small Open European Economies (SSEEs) were marked by a combination of efficient, stable democratic public institutions, a long-term insistence on liberal, open economic principles and finally the ability to define and exploit global niches. This article indicates that the corporate exploitation of global growth opportunities rather built upon deeply rooted capabilities established through various periods of more or less open markets. This variety of economic openness meant that the Danish corporate capabilities mirrored both co-operative experiences from the long-term negotiations with competitors, states and customers, as well as liberal understanding of the need to exploit local, national and global market opportunities.

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83 The markets of diaries, slaughter houses, shipping and breweries were all marked by one actor with more than 60 percent control of the economic activities)


85 For a more detailed description of the dualistic nature of Danish capitalism including liberal and co-operative principles see Iversen, Martin Jes and Andersen, Steen: Denmark: Co-operative Liberalism, in Fellman et. al.: Creating Nordic Capitalism, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.