July 2013

Volume 52, Issue 3
Pages TBA

Collective Bargaining and Faculty Job Satisfaction
JOHN M. KRIEG, CHARLES S. WASSELL, Jr., DAVID W. HEDRICK, STEVEN E. HENSON

Abstract
Estimates of the impact of union membership on job satisfaction suffer from non-random self-selection into unions. In this paper we circumvent this by examining the impact on satisfaction of collective bargaining representation, rather than of union membership. A two-stage technique that controls for non-random selection of faculty into institutions is applied to a panel of faculty at repeatedly observed four-year universities. We find that bargaining agreements increase satisfaction with compensation, reduces satisfaction with faculty workload, and has no statistically measurable impact on overall job satisfaction or on satisfaction with the authority to make decisions regarding instructional duties.

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Reciprocal Loyalty and Union Mediation
GEORGIOS A. PANOS, IOANNIS THEODOSSIOU

Abstract
This study investigates the concept of loyalty in the employer-employee relationship using a stated preference approach and a dataset obtained through purpose build questionnaires. Reciprocal loyalty is defined as a gift exchange. Workers‟ good performance is rewarded by the employer by the provision of a job with a low likelihood of job loss. The study shows that such reciprocal employer–employee loyalty is highly rated by the workers as a desirable job attribute. Loyalty in the employer-employee relationship is differently valued by unionised and non-unionised workers. Overall the evidence suggests that unionised workers are more receptive to arrangements involving reciprocal loyalty. This may be an outcome of adaptation to internalized norms of union behaviour.

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Union Wage Gap in the U.S. Construction Sector: 1983-2007
CIHAN BILGINSOY

Abstract
Wage gap decomposition shows that declining union power was the principal force behind the shrinking union wage premium in the U.S. construction industry between the 1980s and the 2000s. This decline was largely offset by changes in returns to workforce attributes and workforce compositions. Without these moderating effects, the decline in the wage gap would have been twice as large (in log points). The patterns were similar in the basic and mechanical trades, but magnitudes of change were larger in the latter.

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Law and Reaching a First Collective Agreement: Evidence from a Quasi-Experimental Set of Reforms in Ontario
CHRIS RIDDELL

Abstract
We examine the effects of a major labor law reform package in the Canadian province of Ontario on the negotiation of first agreements for newly certified bargaining units using a quasi-experimental research design. We find that first contract success rates were around 10 percentage points higher under the more favorable labor law package. Further, we find that in the more hostile labor regime, only 38% of petitions ultimately reached a first agreement despite the presence of quick-votes and first contract arbitration.

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Flexible Wage Contracts, Temporary Jobs and Worker Performance: Evidence from Italian Firms
MICHELE BATTISTI, GIOVANNA VALLANTI

Abstract
The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on whether performance related pay and contract flexibility affect workers effort and in turn firm productivity using a sample of Italian firms. According to our results, wage flexibility has a significant effect on effort and then on productivity and white collars respond more to monetary incentives than blue collars. Moreover, the presence of a large share of temporary contracts reduces workers’ motivation and effort.

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Sidney and Beatrice Webb’s Institutional Theory of Labor Markets and Wage Determination
BRUCE E. KAUFMAN

Abstract
Sidney and Beatrice Webb are best known for their studies on the history and theory of trade unions. Far less recognized is their complementary institutional theory of labor markets and wage determination. This article presents a distillation and review of the Webbs' labor market theory, including revisionist model of demand and supply, rent theory of income distribution, institutional analysis of market failure, and political economy case for labor market regulation.